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Abstract 
This paper addresses the innovation dynamics induced by environmental policy in the 
automotive industry. It examines car fuel efficiency programs in the EU, the US and Ja-
pan. It concludes that existing programs have not yet succeeded in promoting radical and 
breakthrough technologies, but that, at the moment, the European and Japanese programs 
have more success in stimulating incremental innovations than the US program.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines policy instruments that aim to promote fuel efficiency in passenger 
cars. It examines whether such programs in the EU, the US, and Japan have promoted 
environmental innovation in the automotive industry. Section 2 presents some back-
ground on the car industry and environmentally-induced innovation. Section 3 discusses 
the fuel economy programs of the EU, US and Japan and their results in detail. Section 4 
concludes.      
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2. Drivers of Innovation 
2.1 Introduction 
In this introductory chapter, the car industry, its drivers of innovation, and technologic 
options to improve the fuel economy of cars are discussed. This chapter also recalls a 
previous episode of technology-forcing environmental policies in the car industry and 
tries to draw some lessons.  
2.2 The car industry 
The car industry is a highly dynamic and competitive, global industry. The European car 
industry contributes to the European economy by creating value added (7% of total 
manufacturing output), employment (7% of total manufacturing employment), trade (5% 
of total manufacturing exports), and by investing in research and development (20% of 
total manufacturing R&D) (EC, 2006).  
According to CARS 21 High Level Group, “R&D activities in the automotive industry 
are all the more important as major technological breakthroughs could permanently alter 
the processes employed by the industry. In light of the fact that the industry’s interna-
tional competitors have stepped up their innovative efforts and are making technological 
advances in certain technologies, it is of critical importance that European manufacturers 
are able to retain high investment levels in R&D as well as to rationalise and pool the use 
of R&D resources (EC, 2006: 13).”       
The EU consumer demands “ever-increasing levels of customisation, comfort, and safety 
features in increasingly fuel-efficient vehicles”  (EC, 2006: 13; italics by OK). Hence, 
major drivers of (environmental) innovation in the car industry are consumer demand 
and international competition. The speed with which certain technical innovations in the 
car industry are diffused internationally is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows the 
speed of market penetration of diesel engines with high-pressure injection technology. 
The penetration curve exhibits the typical S-shape of technology diffusion processes. 
Beise and Rennings (2005) point out, however, that there can be large differences in the 
speed and extent of international diffusion of environmental innovations in the car indus-
try. While the catalytic converter diffused rather quickly from the US to other regions, 
European innovations in fuel efficiency and especially in diesel technology for passenger 
cars did affect the US market very much. Reasons for this include the low petrol prices 
in the US that do not stimulate demand for fuel efficient cars in general, and the fact that 
diesel engines generally do not meet the strict US Clean Air Act requirements with re-
spect to the emissions of NOx. (Beise and Rennings, 2005).      
In a survey among firms of the automotive sector in Southern Germany, a distinction 
was made between drivers for product innovation on the one hand, and process innova-
tion on the other hand. Product innovations change the final product, such as changes in 
the overall design and the substitution of plastic for metal parts; process innovations 
concern the way that cars are produced, for example by using water-solvent paints, and 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 4
also changes in motor technology (gas, hydrogen).1 The main motives for environmental 
product innovations were: customer and cost pressure, as well as environmental regula-
tion and company environmental policy. The main motives for process innovation were 
the opening of new markets, gaining of competitive advantage as well as the saving of 
resources, CO2 reduction because of the Kyoto Protocol and company environmental 
policy objectives, and various pieces of environmental regulation, i.e., the EU Directive 
on alternative car fuels,2 and the Euro 4 and 5 emission limit values (Triebswetter and 
Wackerbauer, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.1  International diffusion of diesel high-pressure injection  
(Beise and Rennings, 2005). 
2.3 Policy-induced innovation 
The car industry has been subject to environmental regulation for a number of decades. 
In the late 1960s, the US government set drastic reduction standards for the emissions of 
conventional air pollutants from cars in the 1970 Clean Air Act. The Act required 90 
percent reductions in tailpipe emissions for new 1975 and 1976 automobiles (Gerard and 
Lave, 2003). This presented automakers with major technical and economic challenges. 
As a result, catalytic technologies were developed that eventually became worldwide 
standards. Especially the introduction of the three-way catalyst in 1981 required major 
adjustments in motor control technology, leading to the widespread use of computer 
technology in cars. This computer technology, in its turn, also facilitated further im-
provements in car performance, safety and fuel economy.  In an instructive account of 
                                                   
1
  Triebswetter and Wackerbauer do not explain the criteria for this classification. 
2
  Encompassing the objective that by 2020 20% of all fuels shall be replaced by alternative fu-
els of which 10% shall be gas. This stated objective was an important motive for the sur-
veyed company keep on investing in the development of a series-produced natural-gas bus.      
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the implementation process of the emissions standards of the Clean Air Act, Gerard and 
Lave (2003) point out that the success of the Clean Air Act in inducing the advanced 
emissions control technologies in cars was in part due to favourable technical, political, 
economic and administrative dynamics at that time. These dynamics included the nature 
of the innovation (higher chance of success with incremental improvements of existing 
but yet unproven technologies), the credibility of the regulator (in terms of the likelihood 
of it taking punitative action and its technical expertise), and ‘robust’ competition be-
tween domestic manufacturers, foreign suppliers, and suppliers of component parts. But 
even with favourable conditions, Gerard and Lave (2003) argue, a technology-forcing 
strategy is uncertain, with no guarantees of technological breakthroughs and extremely 
vulnerable to pressures from many different stakeholders and to unforeseen conse-
quences (and something as banal as a change in macroeconomic conditions).    
There is some evidence that the costs of emissions regulations for cars fall over time, 
through ‘learning’, or simply because a change in vehicle design only needs to be devel-
oped once but can be used in later years at no additional costs (Chen et al., 2004). The 
US Office of Science and Technology estimated that initial investment costs per vehicle 
in 1976 due to the Clean Air Act decreased by approximately 30 percent in the following 
ten years due to “increased production efficiency, which will reduce the initial invest-
ment costs as experience is gained in production” (Chen et al, 2004) (see Figure 2.2).       
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Figure 2.2  ‘Learning’curve for emissions controls in cars due to the 1976 emission 
standards in the US, as estimated by the US Office of Science and Technol-
ogy (Chen et al., 2004).   
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It has also been estimated that the cost-effectiveness of the three-way catalyst in the 
Netherlands (in terms of kg NOx reduction per Euro) approximately doubled in the three 
years after its introduction around 1993 (Dings, 1996).  
2.4 Fuel economy 
The fleet-average fuel economy in Europe is second highest in the world, only to be sur-
passed by Japan. Figure 2.3 shows the development of fleet-average fuel economies 
from 2002 to 2006 across major countries and world regions, and projects likely trends 
into the future. The fuel economy in the US is low. Initiatives in California have the po-
tential to improve State fuel economy in the near future. Interesting in Figure 2.3 is the 
position of China with its medium fleet-average fuel economy. With the current concern 
in China about urban air pollution, China may well step-up fuel economy standards for 
cars sold in China. From the perspective of China being the potentially largest growth 
market for automobile sales, it is of major importance that European carmakers do not 
fall behind Japanese carmakers in improving fuel economy.          
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Figure 2.3  Comparison of Fuel Economy and GHG emission standards (Sauer, 2005). 
There are various technological options to improve the fuel economy of cars above its 
present level. The following two tables present options for petrol and diesel cars, respec-
tively. The options relate not only to engines, but also to transmission, aerodynamics, 
and tyres.  
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Table 2.1  Impact on technical improvements on fuel economy of petrol cars (%). 
 Source Description Car size 
  Small Medium Large 
Engine Optimised engine efficiency 4 4 4 
 Direct injection/ stratified charge (lean burn) 10 10 10 
 Direct injection/ homogenous charge 
(stoichiometric) 
5 5 5 
 Mild downsizing with turbo charging 10 10 10 
 Medium downsizing with turbo charging 15 15 15 
 Strong downsizing with turbo charging 20 20 20 
 Variable valve timing 6 6 8 
 Variable valve control 8 8 11 
 Cylinder deactivation 10 10 14 
Transmission 6-speed manual/automatic gearbox 3 3 3 
 Piloted gearbox 5 5 5 
 Continuous variable transmission 9 9 9 
 Dual-clutch 4 4 4 
Hybrid Start-stop function 6 4 3 
 Regenerative braking 5 7 8 
 Mild hybrid (motor assist) 8 11 13 
 Full hybrid (electric drive) 17 20 23 
Body Improved aerodynamic efficiency 2 1.5 1 
 Mild weight reduction 3 3 5 
 Medium weight reduction 5 6 11 
 Strong weight reduction 8 9 16 
Other Low friction tyres 2 2 2 
 DeNOx catalyst – 1 – 1 – 1 
 Source: IEEP/TNO/CAIR, 2005 
 
Table 2.2  Impact on technical improvements on fuel economy of diesel cars (%). 
Source Description Car size 
  Small Medium Large 
Engine Optimised engine efficiency 4 4 4 
 16 valve cylinder head 4 4 4 
 Piezo injectors 0 0 0 
 Mild downsizing with turbo charging 10 10 10 
 Medium downsizing with turbo charging 15 15 15 
 Strong downsizing with turbo charging 20 20 20 
 Cylinder deactivation 10 10 12 
Transmission 6-speed manual/automatic gearbox 3 3 3 
 Piloted gearbox 5 5 5 
 Continuous variable transmission 9 9 9 
 Dual-clutch 4 4 4 
Hybrid Start-stop function 5 4 3 
 Regenerative braking 5 7 9 
 Mild hybrid (motor assist) 8 11 14 
 Full hybrid (electric drive) 15 20 25 
Body Improved aerodynamic efficiency 2 1.5 1 
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 Mild weight reduction 3 3 5 
 Medium weight reduction 5 6 11 
 Strong weight reduction 8 9 16 
Other Low friction tyres 2 2 2 
 DeNOx catalyst – 1 – 1 – 1 
 Particulate trap – 2 – 2 – 2 
Source: IEEP/TNO/CAIR, 2005 
 
The emissions reduction percentages of the tables above cannot always be added as some 
technologic options are mutually exclusive. In addition, the impact of implementing sev-
eral options simultaneously is multiplicative rather than additive (Kampman and Boon, 
2005). According to TNO, hybrid drives in combination with a host of other technical 
adaptations can consume 30 to 40 percent less fuel than conventional petrol cars; for die-
sel cars a fuel consumption benefit of 15 percent may be feasible (Kampman and Boon, 
2005).   
It would be interesting to study how fuel efficiency programs in various regions have 
stimulated or are expected to stimulate specific technologies as listed above. As far as we 
know, no study along these lines has been carried out as yet.     
As yet, no ‘learning’or ‘experience’ curves for energy efficiency improvements in cars 
have been estimated. Experts in this area suggest that the multi-functionality of techno-
logical improvements in consumer products such as cars complicates their measurement 
relative to supply side technologies such as wind energy and solar PV. At the moment, 
research on experience curves of demand side options in energy efficiency is being car-
ried out in the Netherlands (Junginger, 2006).  
2.5 Conclusions 
In sum, the European car industry is highly dynamic and innovative. It’s R&D expendi-
tures are well above average in Europe’s manufacturing sector. Among the most impor-
tant drivers of innovation are consumer demand (for performance, comfort, safety and 
fuel economy), international competition, and environmental objectives and regulations. 
The catalytic converter and the three-way catalyst were induced by tough US regulation 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From that episode, the lesson was drawn that technol-
ogy-forcing regulation may sometimes be successful but that it will always remain a 
risky strategy. One element of success of technology forcing is to build on one or more 
existing technologies that have not yet been proven (commercially) in the area of appli-
cation. For improvements in the fuel economy of cars, many technological options are 
potentially available.       
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3. Policy Instruments and Innovation 
In this chapter, three different fuel-economy instruments are discussed. Section 3.1 dis-
cusses the European ACEA Agreement, Section 3.2 discusses the US CAFE program, 
and Section 3.3 discusses the Top Runner program from Japan.   
3.1 ACEA Agreement – EU  
One important element of the EU’s strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger 
cars and to improve fuel efficiency are the voluntary agreements that it concluded with 
the automobile industry to reduce total new passenger fleet average CO2 emissions ac-
cording to specific targets and timetables.3  The voluntary agreements were in 1998 con-
cluded with the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), the Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), and the Korea Automobile Manufac-
turers Association (KAMA). Henceforth we will label these agreements collectively as 
the ACEA Agreement. The target for new passenger fleet average CO2 emissions is 140 
g CO2/km by 2008/9.4 The Community’s target for 2012 is 120 g CO2/km. This longer-
term target has not yet been included in any formal agreement with the car industry. 
Table 3.1 below shows how these targets can be translated into fuel efficiency standards 
for petrol and diesel cars. The Commission has stated on several occasions that a failure 
of the car industry to meet the 2008/9 targets might lead to mandatory regulation in the 
future. 
Table 3.1 Relationships between CO2 targets and fuel consumption  
Target Fuel consumption (ℓ) per 100 km 
 petrol diesel 
120 gCO2/km 5.1 4.6 
140 gCO2/km 5.9 5.4 
Source: Kågeson, 2005. 
 
Figure 3.1 below shows average specific CO2 emissions for each association and for the 
EU-15 as a whole for the period 1995-2003, and the final target for 2008/9.  
Over the period 1995-2003, overall specific CO2 emissions of new passenger cars on the 
European market fell by almost 12 percent. In the context of this study, three questions 
are of prime importance: 
1) Is the reduction in specific CO2 emissions of new passenger cars due to techno-
logical improvements or are they due to ‘autonomous’ changes in market de-
mand? 
2) What technological improvements have contributed most to the observed reduc-
tions in specific CO2 emissions? 
                                                   
3
  Other elements include fuel-economy labelling on cars, and the promotion of car fuel effi-
ciency by fiscal measures (EC, 2005).  
4
  The target year is 2008 for ACEA and 2009 for JAMA and KAMA. 
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3) To what extent can these technological improvements be attributed to EU poli-
cies, i.e., the voluntary agreements with the car manufacturers’ associations?   
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Figure 3.1  Average specific CO2 emissions of new passenger cars and target. 
A change in average specific CO2 emissions of new passenger cars can have different 
causes. It can be caused by changes in the composition of the fleet because of changes in 
consumer demand. Changes can also occur because of changes in the average weight of 
passenger cars due to increasing comfort and safety features.5  A notable change in 
European car sales in the past decade is the increasing share of diesel cars. Diesel en-
gines have lower specific emissions of CO2 than petrol engines.  
Although changes in consumer demand that have influenced specific CO2 emissions of 
new passenger cars have occurred over the period 1995-2003, a detailed investigation 
into the causes of changes in specific CO2 emissions over that period found no evidence 
that  “the observed total reduction of ACEA’s and JAMA’s CO2 fleet average was sig-
nificantly influenced by other factors than technological developments (DLR, 2004:81).6 
                                                   
5
  Average weight of passenger cars increased from 1.100 kg to 1.200 kg between 1995 and 
2002. A number of safety features such as (additional) airbags and anti-block braking sys-
tems, contributed to this increase in average weight (DLR, 2004).  
6
  The complete quote is: “Overall, the investigation finds some evidence of the influence of 
non-technical factors on average CO2 emissions. Given the magnitude and mixture of nega-
tive and positive effects of these influences, however, no evidence could be found that the 
observed total reduction of ACEA’s and JAMA’s CO2 fleet average was significantly influ-
enced by other factors than technological developments.” (DLR, 2004:81).    
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This strongly suggests that the observed emissions reductions were indeed primarily 
caused by technological developments.  
What kinds of technological development have contributed most to emissions reduc-
tions? For petrol cars it was primarily the change from singlepoint to multipoint injection 
that improved fuel efficiency, for diesel cars it was the almost complete penetration of 
the direct injection/high pressure technology over the period 1995-2003.7 The share of 
direct injection in petrol cars is still very low (DLR, 2004).   
Can these technological developments be (partly or totally) attributed to the Voluntary 
Agreements of the European Commission with the car manufacturers’ associations? In 
other words, what would have happened to car technologies without the voluntary agree-
ments? This question is difficult to answer. 
In his PhD-thesis on voluntary environmental agreements, Zerle (2005) argues that the 
targets of the ACEA agreement are well within the ‘business-as-usual’ pathway of fuel 
economy in Europe.  Figure 3.2 shows the historical trend of fuel economy in Germany 
(ℓ/100km) between 1970 and 2000 and the ACEA targets for 2003 and 2008. Zerle fur-
ther argues that this is little surprising, since ACEA has no real power to force European 
car makers to go beyond their planned (“business-as-usual”) improvements in average 
fuel economy and to coordinate efforts among the car makers. One reason for the rela-
tively weak position of ACEA in this respect is the ease with which car makers can 
withdraw from the Association, as happened with Rover/MG in 2002. The German Ad-
visory Council on the Environment (SRU, 2005) confirmed the analysis of Zerle. The 
Advisory Council writes that: “it must be assumed […] that the achieved reduction was 
sparked by existing incentives and that the self-regulation [the ACEA Agreement, OK] 
effected no further reduction in fuel consumption.” (SRU, 2005: 29).  
The Advisory Council goes on to argue that a basic flaw in the Agreement is that the or-
ganisation that is required to fulfil the agreement – the ACEA – has only limited influ-
ence on how the target is reached. First, ACEA cannot dictate CO2 emissions levels for 
vehicles produced by individual carmakers, and second, ACEA has no influence on the 
consumer who ultimately decides on the composition of the fleet sold in Europe. The 
Advisory Council therefore concludes that achieving the 2012 target would need an al-
ternative set up that would eliminate the mismatch between those who should comply 
with the standard and those who are really targeted by the standard (SRU, 2005).       
  
  
                                                   
7
  In 1995, only Volkswagen/Audi offered some versions of its TDI. Now it is a commonplace 
engine technology for diesel cars (DLR, 2004). 
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Figure 3.2  Historical fuel economy pathway in Germany and ACEA targets (‘ACEA 
Selbstverpflichtung’). 
The car industry should have no difficulties in producing cars with average specific CO2 
emissions of 140 g CO2/km in 2008 and 120 g CO2/km in 2012 from a technological 
point of view (Kågeson, 2005).8 Kågeson (2005) argues that, under current rules, manu-
facturers, wholesalers and car dealers have no incentives to sell fuel-efficient cars. Their 
profit margins are better served by sales of larger and more fuel-consuming vehicles 
such as Multi-Purpose and Sport Utility Vehicles. Kågeson (2005) further argues that no 
individual manufacturer can afford to take a different route (than to produce what the 
market demands) without the support of incentives. If Kågeson is wright this would 
mean that the “business-as-usual” fuel economy pathway of Zerle (Figure 3.2) would 
start levelling-off or would even change direction.  
Hence, although it cannot be excluded that the ACEA Agreement has contributed to 
technological innovation in the car industry, its contribution has very likely been modest 
at best. Whether or not ACEA will comply with the target of 2008 is highly dependent 
upon autonomous changes in market demand on which ACEA has no influence.      
3.2 CAFE – USA  
In 1975, US Congress established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards 
to conserve petroleum and to reduce US reliance on imported oil (Gerard and Lave, 
2003). It has continued to enjoy public support, also as a means to reduce air pollution 
and to curb greenhouse gas emissions, although it has also been criticised by economists 
                                                   
8
  For instance, Toyoto’s hybrid car, the Prius, only emits 104 g CO2/km. For overviews of 
technical options see, a.o., Kågeson (2005), Kampman and Boon (2005), and 
IEEP/TNO/CAIR (2005).  
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on the grounds that the aforementioned goals could be achieved with other instruments at 
less costs (see, for example, NAS, 2002).  
The CAFE standards set mandatory average fuel economy standards for automobile 
manufacturers for passenger cars and light-duty trucks. For passenger cars, the standards 
have been increased from 18 mpg (miles per gallon) in 1978 to 27.5 mpg in 1985 and 
have not been raised since. For light-duty trucks, the standard is 20.7 mpg.  
Compared to the European targets, the CAFE standards are not very ambitious. The 
140 g CO2/km target from the ACEA Agreement translates into a fuel economy standard 
of 5.9 ℓ/100 km (see Table 3.1). The US CAFE standard for petrol passenger cars is 9 
ℓ/100 km and the light-duty truck standards for minivans, pickups and sport utility vehi-
cles are even less ambitious. 
Figure 3.3 below indeed shows that the average fuel economy of new cars in the United 
States has not improved since the mid-1980s. There are many reasons for this trend, per-
haps most importantly the low US petrol prices. NAS (2002) remarks that there are many 
advanced technologies on the market, including direct-injection, direct-injection com-
pression-ignition (diesel) engines, and hybrid electric vehicles that could improve vehi-
cle fuel economy by 20 to 40 percent. With respect to diesel technology, that has, as dis-
cussed earlier, produced large fuel economy gains in Europe, the US has problems with 
emission standards of nitrogen oxides and particulates under the (1990 amendments to 
the) Clean Air Act. According to NAS (2002), if direct-injection gasoline and diesel en-
gines are to be used extensively to improve fuel economy, significant technical devel-
opments concerning emissions control have to occur or adjustments have to be made to 
the Clean Air Act emissions standards (NAS, 2002: 5).          
 
Source: Gerard and Lave, 2003. 
Figure 3.3  New Vehicle Fuel Economy in the United States (1974-2000). 
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What has been the effect of the CAFE standards on the average fuel economy in the US? 
Figure 3.3 shows that average fuel economy increased sharply from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s and then stabilized. Analysts have argued that the initial increase in fuel 
economy was the effect of increases in gasoline prices of the oil shocks of the 1970s and 
not due to CAFE regulations (see, Gerard and Lave, 2003). But according to Gerard and 
Lave (2003), it was after the mid-1980s, when gasoline prices dropped, that “CAFE was 
responsible for maintaining the fleet fuel economy gains of the past decade.” (Gerard 
and Lave, 2003: 4).       
According to an econometric study by Goldberg (1998), the main effect of CAFE has 
been to stimulate the sales of small cars at the expense of larger cars. This effect has 
been partially undone, however, by the loophole that was provided by the lighter light-
duty vehicles standards, that are applicable to large and growing segment of modern, lar-
ger passenger cars, including the minivans, pickups, and sports utility vehicles. Gerard 
and Lave (2003) note that passenger cars accounted for 90 percent of the passenger-
vehicle fleet in 1975, but now vehicle sales are about equally split between cars and light 
trucks.     
Moreover, Kågeson (2005) observed that the low level of compliance penalty fees, 
which, according to him, have not effectively stopped manufacturers from non-
compliance, has also undermined the effectiveness of the CAFE program.  
Concluding then, CAFE may have avoided a collapse of average fleet fuel economy in 
the 1980s when gasoline prices dropped, it has probably not stimulated environmental 
innovation in the US automobile industry very much. It is also probably not a good 
model for Europe, as it gives few incentives to manufacturers of small cars to improve 
fuel efficiency (Kågeson, 2005).            
3.3 Top Runner – Japan       
The Top Runner Program was introduced in Japan in 1999 as part of the revision of the 
Law on the Rational Use of Energy (Naturvårdverket, 2005). The objective of Top Run-
ner Program is to address energy use in the transport, commercial and private sectors. 
One of the targeted sectors is the automobile industry. Among the targeted product 
groups (e.g., passenger cars), the most energy-efficient product (the “Top Runner”) be-
comes the basis of the standard in 3 to 12 year time, taking into account the potential for 
technological innovation and diffusion. The standards in the Top Runner Program are 
used in the Green Purchasing law and the green automobile tax scheme. There is also an 
annual award for the most energy-efficient products and systems. 
The experience with the Top Runner Program has been good. For certain product groups 
– air conditioners, TV sets, and videotape recorders – the results have exceeded expecta-
tion, and not only have manufacturers met standards on a weighted average basis but 
also on an individual model basis (Naturvårdverket, 2005). It is expected that cars will 
manage to meet the Top Runner standards prior to the target year (Naturvårdverket, 
2005).  
Naturvårdverket (2005) lists a number of stronger and weaker points of the Top Runner 
Program. Stronger points include that the program gives incentives for industry-wide en-
vironmental improvements, because the standards do not only look at the best product on 
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the market, but also to the potential for other producers to realistically meet the stan-
dards. The mandatory nature of the program forces producers to meet the standards. The 
standards apply to individual companies, which probably gives more incentives to com-
panies to comply than industry-wide standards such as the ACEA standards. The rela-
tionships of the standards with other policy instruments, public procurement, tax sys-
tems, is interesting. In Japan, the “name-and-shame” element of the program (with its 
annual awards) is also of great importance.    
Weaker points include that the “realistic” levels of the standards (see above) may not 
stimulate radical or break-through innovations, and that the differentiation of standards 
within product groups ensures the availability of a wide range of products, which may 
not all be preferable from an environmental or sustainability perspective. The Top Run-
ner Program for cars, for example, differentiates between weight classes (see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2  Top Runner Fuel Economy Standards (km/ℓ)9. 
Weight (kg) Gasoline Diesel LPG 
< 703 21.2 18.9 15.9 
703-828 18.8 18.9 14.1 
828-1016 17.9 18.9 13.5 
1016-1266 16.0 16.2 12.0 
1266-1516 13.0 13.2 9.8 
1516-1766 10.5 11.9 7.9 
1766-2016 8.9 10.8 6.7 
2016-2266 7.8 9.8 5.9 
> 2266 6.4 8.7 4.8 
Source: (Naturvårdverket, 2005).     
Concluding then, the Top Runner Program has interesting features. It provides for dy-
namic incentives to improve energy efficiency and it affects companies directly. It may 
not, however, provide incentives for radical innovations and some of its success factors 
may by culturally determined and not directly exportable to Europe.                   
                                                   
9
  x km/ℓ is equivalent to 100/x ℓ/100km. The highest fuel efficiency standards are for small 
gasoline cars, they are 4.7 ℓ/100km. Note that the fuel efficiency standard for small diesel 
cars is 5.3 ℓ/100kg, which is comparable to the average ACEA 140 standard.         
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
The European car industry is highly dynamic and innovative. It’s R&D expenditures are 
well above average in Europe’s manufacturing sector. Among the most important drivers 
of innovation are consumer demand (for comfort, safety and fuel economy), international 
competition, and environmental objectives and regulations. The catalytic converter and 
the three-way catalyst were induced by tough US regulation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. From that episode, the lesson was drawn that technology-forcing regulation may 
sometimes be successful but that it will always remain a risky strategy. One element of 
success of technology forcing is to build on one or more existing technologies that have 
not yet been proven (commercially) in the area of application. For improvements in the 
fuel economy of cars, many technological options are potentially available.       
The three fuel-efficiency instruments discussed in Chapter 3 all have different elements 
and specific features. The ACEA program in Europe and the Top Runner program in Ja-
pan are clearly more ambitious in their targets than the CAFE program in the US. A fur-
ther difference is that the Japanese and US programs are mandatory, while the EU pro-
gram is voluntary. Finally, while the EU and US programs set industry-wide standards, 
the Japanese system sets company standards.    
With respect to innovation, the EU and Japanese policy instruments perform better than 
the US CAFE program. This is not surprising, given the large gap between the strin-
gency of fuel-efficiency standards in Europe and Japan on the one hand and the US on 
the other.10 None of the standards, however, is expected to give incentives for radical or 
break-through innovations. Both ACEA and Top Runner seem to be focussing more on 
the rapid diffusion of new technologies and incremental innovations. As yet, however, 
the ACEA agreement has not been extremely successful in stimulating promising tech-
nologies such as direct injection in gasoline cars and the production of hybrid cars.   
It is not yet clear whether the mandatory or voluntary nature of the policy instruments 
makes much of a difference. It is not known yet whether the car industry will meet the 
final ACEA standards in 2008, and how the European Commission will react on a possi-
ble failure. The US CAFE program has mandatory standards, but it also has legal loop-
holes and according to some observers the non-compliance penalties are too small to 
make a big impression on automakers.   
                                                   
10
  One of the reasons for the persistence of this difference is that the US is not a significant ex-
porter of cars to the European and Japanese markets.      
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One interesting distinction between the European ACEA approach and the Japanese Top 
Runner approach is that ACEA sets standards at the industry level, while Top Runner 
sets standards at the company level. Perhaps this latter approach has the advantage that 
companies are more directly involved in the process. It is, for example, remarkable that 
only half of the European automakers mentioned the ACEA standard and progress to-
wards this standard in their annual reports (WRI, 2005).11   
                                                   
11
  Only BMW included information in its 2003 annual report on its strategy to meet the ACEA 
standard  (WRI, 2005). 
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